Public Philosophy

I think it's important to share our research as widely as possible and in a way that's both interesting and accessible to non-academics.

Articles & Chapters

I've published articles in various philosophy journals and contributed to psychological research on the effects of forgiveness.

Presentations

I've presented my research at conferences around the world. This year, I'll be giving talks in Stockholm, Tilburg, Amsterdam, and San Diego.

Public Philosophy

Articles & Chapters

"Forgiveness" in the Oxford Handbook of Moral Responsibility [forthcoming]
  • My aim in this chapter is to explore the connection between forgiveness and responsibility.  One could describe the landscape of the forgiveness debate in any number of ways: by subject (e.g. victim-, self-, third party, and institutional forgiveness), by discipline (e.g., philosophy, theology, social psychology, and psychiatry), by comparison with cognate phenomena (e.g. excuse, justification, mercy, and letting go), by its manifestation (e.g. private or communicated), or in some other way.  My approach is to introduce a common model of forgiveness and some recent challenges to it, each of which highlights potential connections between forgiveness and responsibility.

"Oppression, Forgiveness, and Ceasing to Blame" in Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy (coauthored with Luke Brunning) [forthcoming]
  • Wrongdoing is inescapable. We all do wrong and are wronged; and in response we often blame one another. But if blame is a defining feature of our social lives, so is ceasing to blame. We might excuse, justify, or forgive an offender; or simply let the offense go. We argue that whether and how we relinquish blame depends on many circumstances only partially within our control. Like any norm-governed practice, one can cease to blame appropriately or inappropriately, successfully or unsuccessfully. Success requires that the action be done for the right reasons and secure uptake. We argue that social and material circumstances can compromise one’s ability to successfully cease blaming in the manner one intends. One can fail to relinquish blame and circumstances can also prevent one from doing so. However, uncooperative social and material circumstances do not only arise by chance. Our central argument is that circumstances of oppression can systematically compromise one’s ability and opportunities to effectively perform various ceasing to blame practices. This deprivation is an insidious facet of oppression that is neglected both in theories of oppression and forgiveness but which has significant implications for how we understand the power and purpose of forgiveness.

“Reasons to Forgive” in Analysis [forthcoming]
  • When we forgive, we do so for reasons. One challenge for forgiveness theorists is to explain which reasons are reasons to forgive and which are not. This paper argues that we forgive in response to a perceived change of heart on the part of the offender. The argument proceeds in four steps. First, I show that we forgive for reasons. Second, I argue that forgiveness requires the right kind of reason. Third, I show that these two points explain a common distinction between forgiving and letting go and, in doing so, solve a problem facing many accounts of forgiveness. Finally, I consider candidate reasons to forgive and argue that all of them are either the wrong kind of reason or are instances of a more general reason of the right kind, namely, a perceived change of heart.

“Against Elective Forgiveness” in Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 21.3 (2018)
  • It is often claimed both that forgiveness is elective and that forgiveness is something that we do for reasons. However, there is a tension between these two central claims about the nature of forgiveness. If forgiving is something one does for reasons, then, at least sometimes, those reasons may generate a requirement to forgive or withhold forgiveness. While not strictly inconsistent with electivity, the idea of required forgiveness strikes some as antithetical to the spirit of the concept. They argue that forgiveness is essentially elective. In this paper, I dispute these arguments. I argue that the intuitive plausibility of the position diminishes upon reflection and that the best arguments fail to explain why reasons to forgive, unlike most other reasons for action, cannot generate requirements.

“How is Self-Forgiveness Possible?” in Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 98.1 (2017)
  • The idea of self‐forgiveness poses a serious challenge to any philosopher interested in giving a general account of forgiveness. On the one hand, it is an uncontroversial part of our common psychological and moral discourse. On the other, any account of self‐forgiveness is inconsistent with any general account of forgiveness which implies that only the victim of an offense can forgive. To avoid this conclusion, one must either challenge the particular claims that preclude self‐forgiveness or offer an independently plausible account of self‐forgiveness. I deploy both strategies in this article, explaining what self‐forgiveness is and how it is possible.  

“In Defense of Non-Reactive Attitudes” in Philosophical Explorations 20.3 (2017)
  • Abolitionism is the view that if no one is responsible, then we ought to abandon the reactive attitudes (e.g. resentment, contempt, and guilt). Proponents suggest that reactive attitudes can be replaced in our emotional repertoire by non-reactive analogues (e.g. sadness and disappointment). In this paper, I dispute and reject a common challenge to abolitionism according to which the reactive attitudes are necessary for protesting unfairness and maintaining social harmony. While other abolitionists dispute the empirical basis of this objection, I focus on its implications. I argue that even if non-reactive analogues cannot perform the interpersonal and social functions of reactive attitudes, it does not follow that the losses of abandoning them outweigh the gains of retaining them. The force of the challenge rests on a mistake, identified by John Stuart Mill among others, that is common when evaluating entrenched social practices.

“Reactive Attitudes and Personal Relationships” in Canadian Journal of Philosophy 46.1 (2016)
  • Abolitionism is the view that if no one is responsible, we ought to abandon the reactive attitudes. This paper defends abolitionism against the claim, made by P.F. Strawson and others, that abandoning these attitudes precludes the formation and maintenance of valuable personal relationships. These anti-abolitionists claim (a) that one who abandons the reactive attitudes is unable to take personally others’ attitudes and actions regarding her, and (b) that taking personally is necessary for certain valuable relationships. I dispute both claims and argue that this objection exaggerates the role of the reactive attitudes and underestimates the importance of non-reactive moral emotions.

“The Immediate and Delayed Cardiovascular Benefits of Forgiving” in Psychosomatic Medicine 74.7 (2012) [with Britta A. Larsen, Ryan S. Darby Christine R. Harris, Dana K. Nelkin, and Nicholas J.S. Christenfeld]

Book reviews

Selected presentations

Upcoming
  • "Oppression, Forgiveness, and Ceasing to Blame," A Theory of Social Punishment, Descartes Lectures, Tilburg University (2018)
  • "National Apology," Workshop on Apology and Compensation, Stockholm Centre for the Ethics of War and Peace (2018)
  • Panelist, Fairness and Inequality Session, Workshop on the Ethics and Policy Implications of Algorithms and Big Data, UC San Diego (2019)
 Peer-reviewed
  • "Nudging and Design for Responsibility," Nudging and Moral Responsibility Workshop, VU Amsterdam (2018)
  • "Challenges to the Empirical Study of Forgiveness," European Philosophical Society for the Study of Emotions (2017)
  • "National Apology," European Consortium for Political Research General Conference, University of Oslo (2017)
  • "Forgiveness as Change," 91st Joint Session of the Aristotelian Society and the Mind Association, Edinburgh (2017)
  • "Reasons to Forgive," Forgiveness, Apology, and Reconciliation Workshop, University of Manchester (2017)
  • "Against Elective Forgiveness," Rocky Mountain Ethics Congress, CU Boulder (2016)
  • "Forgiveness: Personal and Political," Workshop on Emotions and Conflict, University of Pisa (2016)
Invited
  • "Letting Go of Blame," Workshop on Blame and Forgiveness, University of Oslo (2018)
  • "Institutional Forgiveness: Adapting the Practice to Law and Forensic Psychiatry," Center for Ethics, Law, and Mental Health (CELAM), University of Gothenburg (2016)

Dissertation

"Abolitionism and the Value of the Reactive Attitudes" 
  • I argue for Abolitionism—the view that if no one is responsible, then we ought to abandon the reactive attitudes. There are two powerful reasons, one moral and one epistemological, for this conditional obligation. Just as it is wrong to punish those who are not blameworthy, so it is wrong to blame those who are not blameworthy, all else being equal. Moreover, if we are not responsible, then taking reactive attitudes toward one another gets the facts wrong. When we resent one another, we ascribe properties, abilities, and capacities that the other does not actually have. Against opponents of abolitionism, I argue a) that we are able to prevent reactive attitudes from forming and to eliminate them once they arise and b) that human existence would not be impoverished by their absence. 
  • Committee: Dana K. Nelkin (chair), John Martin Fischer, David O. Brink, Richard Arneson, Nicholas Christenfeld, Christine Harris.