Research

Public Philosophy

I think it's important to share our research as widely as possible and in a way that's both interesting and accessible to non-academics.

I've published articles in various philosophy journals and contributed to psychological research on the effects of forgiveness.

I've presented my research at conferences around the world. This year, I'll be giving talks in Stockholm, Tilburg, Amsterdam, and San Diego.

“Forgiving Hate Crimes: The Case of Dylann Roof” for the International Network of Hate Studies, 8 March 2017 (with Luke Brunning)
“Should we forgive ourselves?” for A2Ethics, 8 November 2016
“Is tobacco control a “best buy” for the developing world?” for Giving What We Can, 7 September 2015

“Against Elective Forgiveness” in Ethical Theory and Moral Practice (forthcoming)

It is often claimed both that forgiveness is elective and that forgiveness is something that we do for reasons. However, there is a tension between these two central claims about the nature of forgiveness. If forgiving is something one does for reasons, then, at least sometimes, those reasons may generate a requirement to forgive or withhold forgiveness. While not strictly inconsistent with electivity, the idea of required forgiveness strikes some as antithetical to the spirit of the concept. They argue that forgiveness is essentially elective. In this paper, I dispute these arguments. I argue that the intuitive plausibility of the position diminishes upon reflection and that the best arguments fail to explain why reasons to forgive, unlike most other reasons for action, cannot generate requirements.

“Reasons to Forgive” in Analysis (forthcoming)

When we forgive, we do so for reasons. One challenge for forgiveness theorists is to explain which reasons are reasons to forgive and which are not. This paper argues that we forgive in response to a perceived change of heart on the part of the offender. The argument proceeds in four steps. First, I show that we forgive for reasons. Second, I argue that forgiveness requires the right kind of reason. Third, I show that these two points explain a common distinction between forgiving and letting go and, in doing so, solve a problem facing many accounts of forgiveness. Finally, I consider candidate reasons to forgive and argue that all of them are either the wrong kind of reason or are instances of a more general reason of the right kind, namely, a perceived change of heart.

“How is Self-Forgiveness Possible?” in Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 98.1 (2017)

The idea of self‐forgiveness poses a serious challenge to any philosopher interested in giving a general account of forgiveness. On the one hand, it is an uncontroversial part of our common psychological and moral discourse. On the other, any account of self‐forgiveness is inconsistent with any general account of forgiveness which implies that only the victim of an offense can forgive. To avoid this conclusion, one must either challenge the particular claims that preclude self‐forgiveness or offer an independently plausible account of self‐forgiveness. I deploy both strategies in this article, explaining what self‐forgiveness is and how it is possible.

“In Defense of Non-Reactive Attitudes” in Philosophical Explorations 20.3 (2017)

Abolitionism is the view that if no one is responsible, then we ought to abandon the reactive attitudes (e.g. resentment, contempt, and guilt). Proponents suggest that reactive attitudes can be replaced in our emotional repertoire by non-reactive analogues (e.g. sadness and disappointment). In this paper, I dispute and reject a common challenge to abolitionism according to which the reactive attitudes are necessary for protesting unfairness and maintaining social harmony. While other abolitionists dispute the empirical basis of this objection, I focus on its implications. I argue that even if non-reactive analogues cannot perform the interpersonal and social functions of reactive attitudes, it does not follow that the losses of abandoning them outweigh the gains of retaining them. The force of the challenge rests on a mistake, identified by John Stuart Mill among others, that is common when evaluating entrenched social practices.

Abolitionism is the view that if no one is responsible, we ought to abandon the reactive attitudes. This paper defends abolitionism against the claim, made by P.F. Strawson and others, that abandoning these attitudes precludes the formation and maintenance of valuable personal relationships. These anti-abolitionists claim (a) that one who abandons the reactive attitudes is unable to take personally others’ attitudes and actions regarding her, and (b) that taking personally is necessary for certain valuable relationships. I dispute both claims and argue that this objection exaggerates the role of the reactive attitudes and underestimates the importance of non-reactive moral emotions.

“The Immediate and Delayed Cardiovascular Benefits of Forgiving” in Psychosomatic Medicine 74.7 (2012) [with Britta A. Larsen, Ryan S. Darby Christine R. Harris, Dana K. Nelkin, and Nicholas J.S. Christenfeld]

Mariam Thalos' A Social Theory of Freedom. Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews, 12 November 2016.

Upcoming

"Oppression, Forgiveness, and Ceasing to Blame," A Theory of Social Punishment, Descartes Lectures, Tilburg University (2018)
"National Apology," Workshop on Apology and Compensation, Stockholm Centre for the Ethics of War and Peace (2018)

Peer-reviewed

"Nudging and Design for Responsibility," Nudging and Moral Responsibility Workshop, VU Amsterdam (2018)
"Challenges to the Empirical Study of Forgiveness," European Philosophical Society for the Study of Emotions (2017)
"National Apology," European Consortium for Political Research General Conference, University of Oslo (2017)
"Forgiveness as Change," 91st Joint Session of the Aristotelian Society and the Mind Association, Edinburgh (2017)
"Reasons to Forgive," Forgiveness, Apology, and Reconciliation Workshop, University of Manchester (2017)
"Against Elective Forgiveness," Rocky Mountain Ethics Congress, CU Boulder (2016)
"Forgiveness: Personal and Political," Workshop on Emotions and Conflict, University of Pisa (2016)

Invited

"Letting Go of Blame," Workshop on Blame and Forgiveness, University of Oslo (2018)
"Institutional Forgiveness: Adapting the Practice to Law and Forensic Psychiatry," Center for Ethics, Law, and Mental Health (CELAM), University of Gothenburg (2016)